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ABSTRACT: This essay on the social history of logic instruction considers the programmatic writings of
Carnap/Neurath, but especially the widely read book by Lillian Lieber, Mits, Wits and Logic (1947), where Mits is
the man in the street and Wits the woman in the street. In the ‘pre-Toulmin’ days it was seriously argued that the
intense study of formal logic would create a more rational frame of mind and have many beneficial effects upon
social and political life. It arose from the conviction that most metaphysical conundrums, religious and political
problems and even fanaticism had their root in the irrationality of ordinary discourse, which had to be replaced by
the more logical ‘ideal language’ of Principia Mathematica. The enthusiastic promotion of formal logic occurred at
a time when it was widely thought that minds could be ‘made over’, ‘reprogrammed’ by proper intervention. This
stands in stark contrast to the motivation for teaching informal logic and critical thinking, as becomes apparent in a
1981 exchange between Ralph Johnson and Gerald Massey in Teaching Philosophy. Most of this essay focuses on
Lillian Lieber, an earnest and enthusiastic advocate of the cause of formal logic, and on the reasons for the
widespread conviction that, for the sake of peace and social harmony, formal logic should, if possible, be taught to
every man, woman and child.
KEY WORDS: ideal language, programming, Lieber, Ralph Johnson, Gerald Massey, social importance of logic

1. INTRODUCTION
These days courses in formal logic attract far fewer students than they once did. The question we
raise is not why there are so few participants now, but why there ever were so many. Not long
ago it was widely thought imperative, not just desirable, that every college and university
student should have at least some knowledge of formal logic. The reason sometimes given was
that this pursuit has broad and good effects upon the mind: discipline of thought, awareness of
connections, etc., benefits that a couple of generations earlier were attributed to the study of
Latin, which was taught everywhere, but rarely to the point of actual comprehension. We offer
here some reflections on the social role assigned to logic instruction in the ‘pre – Toulmin’ days.
A.N. Whitehead once remarked that ‘operations of thought are like cavalry charges; they
must be carefully planned and they require fresh horses’ (Belnap, p. 420). Gilbert Ryle carried
forward the military analogy, and claimed that training in formal logic is much like a paradeground drill:
It is not the stereotyped motions of drill, but its standards of perfection of control which are transmitted
from the parade-ground to the battlefield … To know how to go through completely stereotyped
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movements in artificial parade-ground conditions with perfect correctness [though ‘unmitigated tedium’] is
to have learned not indeed how to conduct oneself in battle, but how rigorously to apply standards of
soldierly efficiency even to unrehearsed actions and decisions in novel and nasty situations and in irregular
and unfamiliar country. (Ryle, pp. 112, 123)

Kenneth Keyes admonishes: ‘You will be wasting your time if you don’t do your best to work
these thinking habits deeply into your nervous system’ (p. 35).
Toulmin argues that treating logic as an analysis of the nature of thought will either turn
it into a technology where ‘a textbook of logic becomes as it were a craft manual’ or else into a
branch of psychology (p. 4). But Ryle’s is an inverse psychologism: logic does not record the
mind’s actions, but disciplines them. He does not suggest the ‘primitive’ psychologism (cf.
Toulmin, pp. 84-88) that takes logic to be to the mind what anatomy is to the body (as it has
sometimes been put). He is arguing, rather, that the diligent study of formal logic will
sufficiently restructure the mind to prepare it for life's and philosophy’s struggles. It is more like
massage therapy than anatomy. He notes that
With a negligible number of exceptions, every philosopher of genius and nearly every philosopher of even
high talent…has given himself some schooling in some parts of Formal Logic, and his subsequent
philosophical reasonings have exhibited the effects upon him of this…, including sometimes his revolts
against it. (Ryle, p. 112)

There is some empirical evidence for this. Inspecting their vitae, I have concluded that Johnson,
Blair, Hansen, Govier, Groarke, Tindale, Gilbert and other front horses of the informal logic
movement have all been drilled on the parade ground of formal logic - in some cases I was an
eye witness. If Ryle is right, this explains their success. They will of course deny this, but denial
is a standard strategy of self defence.
2. MASSEY VS. JOHNSON
1981 is an interesting year in the dispute between informal logicians and the formal lot. In that
year Nuel Belnap published an article in Teaching Philosophy where he quotes an example from
Copi’s logic text (the 1972 edition):
If the airplane had engine trouble, it would have landed at Bridgeport. If the airplane did not have engine
trouble, it landed at Cleveland. The airplane did not land at either Bridgeport or Cleveland. Therefore it
landed in Denver.

Belnap, as he should be, is shocked by the claim that this absurdity is a valid argument. How did
Denver get into the picture? He says that Copi ‘tries to de-shock us by pointing out that the
premises are inconsistent, and that ‘any argument with inconsistent premises is valid, regardless
of what its conclusion may be’’ (Belnap, p. 424). This is, however, an intramural scrap among
formalists. Anderson and Belnap’s brilliant contribution to the logic of relevance
notwithstanding, they show little sympathy for the objectives of informal logic. In that same
year, and in the same journal, Gerald Massey argued
Logic inculcates portable skills and strategies that students can bring to bear on all their other subjects at
great profit. The result is a degree of intellectual sophistication otherwise unattainable (304)...[whereas]
informal logic amounts to little more than unpremeditated importation of sloppiness, confusion and
obscurity into a subject (logic) where rigor, clarity, and precision ought to reign supreme. (Massey, p. 305)
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Plainly, this was aimed at Ralph Johnson who had earlier maintained in the same journal that
The goal of an informal logic course is to equip the students with the skills needed to make a coherent
assessment of the logical merits and demerits of real arguments, and the capacity to transform that
assessment into an intelligent piece of logical criticism...There is no real profit to be derived from
analyzing those invented and docile creatures which, until very recently, populated logic texts. (Johnson, p.
124)

Everyone remembers the docile creatures like ‘Write in symbolic notation ‘No unicorns eat oats’
and ‘Some blondes have blue eyes’’ (Brennan, pp. 29, 36). The informal logic texts, on the other
hand, do not focus on parade ground drill, on the re-programming of mind through exposure to
formalism, but charge directly into manoeuvres, simulations of battle that are close to the real
thing, and discuss and analyse issues of present and important concern. Quickly a couple of
examples, though mentioning them to this audience is like carrying coals to Newcastle or, as the
Germans say, carrying owls to Athens.
As usual, Canadians, who are incompetent, inefficient, lazy, miserable, and jealous, cannot compete with
the USA... Consequently, they always want U.S. products and performers banned so they can produce the
usually poor product (Johnson and Blair p. 131, quoting from the Edmonton Journal).
Crawford Kilian equates the specificity of recruiting a black person as head of the Johnston Chair for Black
Studies at Dalhousie University to establishing segregated public toilets for blacks... (Groarke, Tindale, and
Fisher, p. 282, quoting a letter to the Globe and Mail.)
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So then, analyze this and contrast it with the docile ‘The owl of Minerva flies at night. Therefore
Minerva has exactly one owl’.
3. THE IDEAL LANGUAGE
There was a time when in much of the philosophical scene ‘classical’ logic, i.e. the logic of
Principia Mathematica, (which is two-valued, with excluded middle, non-empty domain),
enjoyed a monopoly position. Some, e.g. Gustav Bergmann, deemed it to be the ‘Ideal
Language’. This was meant to imply that whatever cannot be expressed in its formalism is
nonsensical.1 That ideal was still much argued in the 1950s, but had its proper home some years
before in the Vienna Circle, Reichenbach’s school in Berlin and the Warsaw logicians. It arose
from the conviction that most metaphysical conundrums, religious and political problems and
even fanaticism had their root in the irrationality of ordinary discourse.
In a programmatic statement of August 1929 Neurath (with Hahn and Carnap), made
much of the ‘logical origins of metaphysical aberration’, and the ‘too narrow tie to the form of
traditional languages’ (Neurath 1973 p. 9, their italics). These metaphysical aberrations were
never taken as harmless: they lead not just to a distortion of thought, but of life. The pamphlet
ends with these words:

Historians of logic sometimes savaged earlier systems of logic by treating them as anticipatory gropings to
discover the one true logic. The treatment of Bolzano in Bar-Hillel (1952) and some other commentators is of this
sort. Like many others he was imbued with missionary certitude that Principia Mathematica was the ideal language,
and that earlier logics were either way stations on the path to that summit, or else had no standing in the history of
logic. Bar-Hillel’s reconstruction summarizes Bolzano’s theory of consequence in 22 propositions, eight of which
are anti-theorems or not provable in Bolzano, while three of Bolzano’s theorems (WL § 155 No 4, 7, 21) are antitheorems or just nonsense in Bar-Hillel’s reconstruction.
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The scientific world-conception is close to the life of the present. Certainly it is threatened with hard
struggles and hostility. Nevertheless there are many who do not despair but, in view of the present social
situation, look forward with hope to the course of events to come. Of course not every adherent of the
scientific world conception will be a fighter. Some, seeking solitude, will lead a withdrawn existence on
the icy slopes of logic; some may even disdain mingling with the masses and regret the ‘trivialized’ form
that these matters inevitably take on spreading. However, their achievements too will take a place among
the historic developments. We witness the spirit of the scientific world-conception penetrating in growing
measure the forms of personal and public life, in education, upbringing, architecture, and the shaping of
economic and social life according to rational principles. The scientific world conception serves life, and
life receives it. (pp. 19 f.)

Carnap expressed similar sentiments in Der logische Aufbau der Welt of 1928, with a somewhat
darker, and as it turned out more realistic, assessment of trends in the ‘philosophic-metaphysical
and religious domain that opposes the [scientific] stance’. He noted that they had become ‘much
stronger’ (Carnap, 1961, p. XX). Not much later disaster struck. Grelling, Dubislav,
Lindenbaum and some others paid with their life, the rest fled the continent of Europe.2 But they
continued their struggle for the scientific worldview, which in many cases took the form of
writing text books in symbolic logic. In 1946 Tarski said this about his task:
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I have no illusions that the development of logical thought...will have a very essential effect upon the
process of the normalisation of human relationships; but I do believe that the wider diffusion of the
knowledge of logic may contribute positively to the acceleration of this process. (Tarski, p. XV)

He goes on to say that by making concepts precise and uniform in its own field it sets an
example for other domains and thus contributes to better understanding ‘between those who
have the will to do so’. Moreover,
By perfecting and sharpening the tools of thought, it makes men more critical - and thus makes less likely
their being misled by all the pseudo-reasonings to which they are in various parts of the world incessantly
exposed today. (ibid.)

We also hear that on one of their walks, Bertrand Russell startled Lady Ottoline by announcing
that he found it difficult to talk to ordinary mortals, ‘for the language they use is so inaccurate
that to me it seems absurd’ (Monk, p. 436).
In 1981, the time of the Johnson-Massey dispute, formal logic had become a new game.
The Age of Aquarius had dawned not only in Haight Ashbury: formal Logicians, too, had begun
to do their own thing, devising deviant logics and destroying the unifying belief in the one ideal
language. Many-valued logic had been around for some time; intuitionist logic had been
introduced; now there was relevance logic, modal logic, free logic and a garden of other
varieties.

2
Not many logicians of note remained in Germany, and logic, or ‘logistics’ as they called it, came to be tarred with
the same brush as Relativity Theory, which was ‘jewish physics’: ‘The so-called Vienna Circle, a collection of
people largely of foreign race, for the most part of near-eastern and oriental race, has proclaimed a new logic that is
totally distinct from Arian logic. This ‘Vienna Circle’ to which Einstein was allied, claims that for them there is no
logic, that the primary thing is formalistic, calculating thought, logic secondary. One can sense the Near Easterner
who calculates and calculates until reality disappears’ (Tirald, 1936, p. 51). The development, and even acceptance,
of formal logic was set back in Germany not only by the emigration of its practitioners and these scurrilous attacks,
but as well by the almost universal opposition of the academic establishment. At most universities this lasted for a
couple of decades after WW 2.
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The period of classical logic’s monopoly and trust invested in its salutary power and
social value coincided with another ideology, rooted in the belief that human minds can be
reprogrammed, made over -- brainwashed if you will. It follows that formal logic should be
taught early in life, widely and intensively. (Patrick Suppes then published a book Set theory for
Kindergarten.) The belief in the malleability and perfectibility of mind has a long tradition.
Hartley writes in his Observations on Man of 1749:
If beings of the same nature, but whose affections and passions are, at present, in different proportions to
each other, be exposed for an indefinite time to the same impressions and associations, all their particular
differences will, at last, be overruled, and they will become perfectly similar, or even equal. They may also
be made perfectly similar in a finite time, by a proper adjustment of the impressions and associations.
(Hartley 84 f. : Passmore, p. 166)
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J.B. Watson (the man who taught the American woman to smoke) wrote:
Some day we shall have hospitals devoted to helping us change our personality, because we can change the
personality as easily as we can change the shape of our nose... I wish I could picture for you what a rich and
wonderful individual we should make of every healthy child. (Watson, p. 302, Passmore, p. 167)
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The theory was applied with obscene persistence in Ewen Cameron’s clinic at McGill
University, where he destroyed minds with massive electro shocks, but then could not reprogram them. We should also note the confident conviction of Neurath and others that they
were an avant-garde, ahead of the times, with the common folk to follow in due course. I give
an example from the world of Music. Anton Webern (who died in 1945) thought that there
would come a time when the post-man on his rounds will whistle his tunes. He was wrong.
4. MITS, WITS, AND LOGIC
The ideological, indeed political component to the promotion of formal logic together with the
just mentioned factors is nowhere more eloquently expressed than in Lillian Lieber’s Mits, Wits
and Logic (Lieber, 1960). Mits is the famous man in the street, Wits the woman in the street, and
a third character is SAM: science, arts and mathematics. Rudolf Carnap endorsed the book:
Not only did I find ‘Mits, Wits and Logic’ exceedingly well done...but I was highly gratified to find there
the impressive connection of the scientific material with your Weltanschauung, and I am delighted that you
too are so deeply impressed with the necessity of avoiding another war...(Lieber, p.7)

The author gratefully acknowledged as well Ernest Nagel’s ‘enthusiastic expression of approval’
(p. 11). The message of the book was not merely that logic should be taught in order to sharpen
the mind, to make students more cautious reasoners, more aware of fallacy and deception.
Logic, specifically formal logic and Boolean algebra, was thought to play a key role in the
rational reconstruction of the individual mind and indeed of the social fabric, and at the very
least to satisfy the role that Ryle had assigned to formal logic. I reproduce here excerpts from the
text as it was printed. Lieber comments:
This is not intended to be
free verse.
Writing each phrase
on a separate line

facilitates rapid reading
and everyone
is in a hurry
nowadays

124

ROLF GEORGE AND NINA GANDHI

Lieber first considers why trust should be put in SAM, since scientists, though they have done
some wonderful things, are not better than the rest of us (perhaps good on Sundays but pirates
on all the other days of the week) (p. 17 f.).
But SAM himself is
DIFFERENT
for he is the
ESSENCE of
what is best in
Science,
Art,
Mathematics,

and therefore is
good and true and beautiful
on all the days of the week
and is always available
to guide and help us
if we would but
go to him
But “HOW?” (p. 18 f.)

SAM’s most important teaching is that we should not share the FEELING of confidence of the
‘uneducated man out in his own back yard’ in the REALITY of what he sees (p. 41). We should
rather embrace a theory only ‘if it explains more observations more adequately’ (p. 42), like
heliocentric, rather than geocentric, astronomy. This is not really a stressful thing since
It is the nature of our minds
that
when we get used to an idea
we accept it

quite cheerfully;
it becomes the
NEW REALISM. (p. 42)

The people who accept this modern realism are familiar with the process of ongoing
sophistication. They are ‘PREPARED FOR CHANGE and more willing and able to make
NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS’ (p. 44).
SAM knows that
such adaptation is
entirely possible for
human beings,
and therefore for
YOU.
And that
all you need for this is
more EDUCATION of a kind that
will bring you
UP TO DATE on

Science,
Art,
Mathematics,
and then
your own wonderful possession,
your human brain
will accept this
NEW REALISM
which will help you, too,
to live in this
MODERN WORLD. (p. 45)

This new realism requires that we should become familiar with the abstract, since the best
descriptions of reality are found in the equations of scientists. Specifically ‘a good way to
describe a ‘real’ thing is that which remains INVARIANT from different viewpoints’ (p. 58).
The book then discusses, with quite sophisticated examples, invariance under translation of axes,
under rotation etc. Two observers, K and K’, can agree on many things by focusing on
INVARIANTS. They then have ‘some common ground where they can do business together! Is
there not a moral here for human relations?’ (p. 60). We may speculate that the comprehensive
repatterning of the mind resulting from the study of formal logic was thought to have
wholesome social consequences because, as noted, the orthodox Principia logic did not even
allow the formulation of first person expressions. One cannot even say in this formalism, and
soon one would be unable even to think ‘I love you’, but only ‘Otto loves Alma’.
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The education Lieber envisaged would obviously take a long time. Meanwhile, we need
an ‘emergency program’, which calls for an international police force, disarmament of all
nations and so forth (p. 50). Those who think war inevitable and other obscurantists and fear
mongers, the ANTI-SAM-ITES, must be defeated by reason; there is a race on between
education and catastrophe. Such training and effort are ESSENTIAL in a DEMOCRACY (p.
138). After lengthy preliminaries that justify the enterprise, Lieber finally gets down to actual
logic instruction. Chapter XX, on Boolean algebra, begins thus:
Are you learning
how to follow
SAM’s advice?
This is your best
INSURANCE.
against CATASTROPHE.
If you realize that

ONE WORLD
has now become
IMPERATIVE
then you may wish to read more about
LOGIC,
for you will need it
if you are here ‘to tell the tale’. (p. 182 f.)
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Logic is needed, and if we get into it with SAM at our side to LEAD us, we shall tackle our
problems in his spirit of
FAITH,
HOPE,
CHARITY,
JUSTICE,
MERCY,
HUMILITY,
INTELLIGENCE,

IMAGINATION,
MODERN REALIS M
MODERN ABSTRACT TOOLS
in short,
with the essence of
what is best in
human nature. (p. 234)

Lieber’s general opinion was widely shared. ‘To solve the world’s problems’, another logic
book remarked ‘we must have brave new thinkers for our world’ (Keyes, p. 236). That book
goes on, with illustrations, to conjure a catastrophic atomic future that will surely arrive if logic
is not studied assiduously. A great many more sources could be cited but we add only two.
Neurath, always given to programmatic statements, noted that, of course, not everyone could be
a practising scientist,
But it is intensely desirable and under certain conditions practicable that all human beings become scientific
in their attitudes: genuinely intelligent in their ways of thinking and acting. (Neurath, p. 38)
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Finally, Charles Morris said
It is because of [the] relation of scientific activity to other activities that the scientific habit of mind, and
scientific results are of such potential promise in society at large and education in particular. (Morris, p. 74)

Morris then pays tribute to Dewey, who had ‘devoted his life to the formulation and assessment
of the social, cultural and educational implications of the scientific habit of mind’ (p. 75).
Dewey’s intentions had been broader, not specifically wedded to the logic of Principia, but he
had prepared the ground for the ready acceptance of the message of the many immigrants. Tyron
Edwards remarked, in the spirit of Dewey,
The great end of education is to discipline rather than furnish the mind; to train it to the use of its own
powers, rather than fill it with the accumulation of others. (Keyes, p. 230)
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This emphasis on methodology rather than the mastery of literary or philosophical canons
advanced the fortune of formal logic teaching, which soon grew to monumental proportions.
Lieber thought that the development of atomic weaponry lent new urgency to this message. The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists had begun to appear, with its ominous clock showing just
minutes to doomsday. On the opposing side we find various interests pushing for atomic
armament, deterrence; there were nationalist groups, even religious fanatics welcoming an
imminent Armageddon. The division was obvious: science, sanity and logic in one corner,
ANTI-SAM-ITISM in the other.
She held that intersubjective, scientific cognition can and must replace subjective
perception. We must come to think of objects in the world not just from our viewpoint, and as
they appear to our senses, but ‘objectively’, that is, in terms of scientific realism. Social reform
must rest on a scientific culture at whose foundation lie the tough and rigorous canons of
mathematical logic, paradigmatically formulated in Principia Mathematica. Logical shrewdness,
moderation, and a suspicious and sceptical mind-set are not in the end enough. The next step in
her argument gives pause, however: as scientific realism replaces subjective perception, moral
subjectivism and individualism will give way to an objective, communitarian appreciation of
values, goals and needs. No real argument is offered why this transformation of values would
occur. It was thought to attend scientific realism as the shadow follows the substance. This
glowing optimism was a shared faith of the neo-positivist movement.
Logic teaching must be got into the schools as soon as possible, preferably through a
massive programme. There is a race on. These days there is a great deal of suspicion of such
broadly based initiatives. But it was not so outlandish, at that time, to suppose that a benign
government could bring forth common and shared educational goals. ‘In the experience of that
generation’, notes Theodor Roszak, ‘government meant the New Deal that had brought the
Nation out of the Depression. That same government had led the Nation to victory in World War
II... People trusted the government to solve problems and provide leadership’ (Roszak, p. 65).
To have more, and more pervasive, government did not seem irrational; indeed, not only the
authorities, but the broad citizenry regarded even the few anti-government protests with alarm.
Lieber’s move from scientific objectivism to moral altruism is, unfortunately, disproved in her
own book. In uncharacteristic sloppiness she cites a book she had not carefully read, noting that
the strict logical approach had now been applied to the study of human relations and decision
making in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. This
calls for a brief digression.
Game Theory, Lieber thinks, will ‘PUT THE WONDERFUL MATHEMATICAL
SYMBOLISM to NEW and IMPORTANT USES’ (Lieber, p. 83). Yet Game Theory would be
closely associated with both individualistic rationality and nuclear armament, both of which
Lieber hoped SAM would defeat. Game Theory treats of ‘conflict among rational but distrusting
beings’ (v. Neumann, p. 39) and began with two-person, zero-sum games in which one
participant could win only if another lost. This formed the foundation for the individuality
implicit in game theory strategy and the minimax theorem, which would find a rational solution
to games based on self-interest and mistrust (v. Neumann, p. 97). As the theory was extended to
non-zero-sum games, co-operation began to find some foothold—a promising development
since non-zero-sum games seemed much more applicable to real life.
At this point Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher discovered the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This
non-zero-sum game cripples Lieber’s theory of co-operation and collectivism through
rationality, as the possibility of co-operation makes a rational decision in the Prisoner’s
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Dilemma much more difficult than in the zero-sum game. Rationality and logic, irrationally
enough, leads players of this game to receive less than they would have had they co-operated.
Defection is the only rational solution. It was in this reasoning that the Cold War that Lieber
condemned so strongly found a logical basis.
Game theory was seen as ‘propagat[ing]...long term changes...in a paranoid and odious
direction. [This is said in reference] not only [to] the propagation of the premises of distrust
which are built into the von Neumann model ex hypothesi, but also [to] the more abstract
premise that human nature is unchangeable’ (from a 1952 letter by anthropologist Gregory
Bateson [Heims, p. 307]). Lieber would have been better off omitting reference to von
Neumann, a man who was known as early as 1950 to support preventive war. This man, who
Lieber thought was forging new ground for logic and rational thinking, is quoted as saying ‘If
you say let’s bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at five o’clock, I say
why not one o’clock?’ (Heims, p. 247)
I don’t want to go as far as to claim that game theory contributed to the decline of faith in
formal logic. But it certainly destroyed the faith that formal logic and scientific rationality create
communitarian values.
CONCLUSION
Formal logic instruction is no longer thought a pre-eminent instrument of social improvement,
partly because the united front of classical logic has split up into a plethora of ‘deviant’ logics,
and surely also because claims that political maturity, or even communitarian virtue, are
nourished by the study of formal logic are vacuous. Masters of the subject are not obviously
more politically aware or mature than others; Frege is a notorious example, so is von Neumann,
and I could add others to that list. Wholesome political and social effects are more likely brought
on by informal logic instruction properly conceived.
And also, the current climate of political opinion does not favour the ideals Neurath and
others dreamt of: SHARING, WORLD GOVERNMENT, INTERNATIONAL POLICING
(Lieber’s words). Teachers of logic and critical thinking now set themselves more modest goals.
No one denies that logic, properly taught and not stuck on formalism, does indeed make people
more cautious in their reasoning, less gullible, more coherent, less moved by unreflected
opinion. This is a good and socially valuable thing and justifies its broad teaching. While reason
itself once seemed to bring altruism in its train, the rhetoric of rationality has now been captured
by the political right. The charming, if overblown, expectations of Mits, Wits and Logic are
gone. Applied logic has become more critical of itself and is now meant to provide a tool kit
mostly for coping in the ongoing struggle of the individual against deception and manipulative
political and commercial propaganda. The public activity of the formal logician no longer
includes social reform as an integral part: no one now thinks that logic as such brings forth
ideology, and many would be alarmed at the thought that it might.
Note: We have been critical of Lillian Lieber’s message, but have the highest respect for her
person and achievements. She died in obscurity in 1986 at the age of 100. In the 1930’s and 40’s
she chaired the mathematics department of Long Island University, in those days an
extraordinary achievement for a woman, founded the Galois Institute in Brooklyn (it closed in
the 60’s) and became well known for her books and heroic efforts to bring science and
mathematics to the common people. We print her picture (1910) and list her publications, many
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illustrated by her husband Hugh Gray Lieber: Non-euclidean
Geometry, Academy Press 1931, Galois and the Theory of Groups,
Lancaster, PA 1932, The Einstein Theory of Relativity, Lancaster, PA
1936, The Education of TC Mits, Galois Institute, Brooklyn 1942,
Modern Mathematics for TC Mits, The Celebrated Man In The Street,
Allen&Unwin, London 1946, Take a Number: Mathematics for the
Two Billion, Lancaster, PA 1946, Mits, Wits and Logic, W.W. Norton,
NY 1947, The Einstein Theory of Relativity, D. Dobson, London 1936,
Infinity, Rinehart, NY 1953, Mits, Wits, and Logic, Galois Institute,
Brooklyn 1954, Lattice Theory; the Atomic Age in Mathematics,
Galois Institute 1959, Human values and science, art and mathematics
Norton, NY 1961, Mathematics: First S-t-e-p-s. F. Watts, NY 1963.
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